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In the current research on media and communication, Western internet companies 
(e.g., Google and Facebook) are typically described as digital platforms, yet these 
actors increasingly rely on infrastructural properties to expand and maintain their 
market power. Through the case study of the Chinese social media application, 
WeChat, we argue that WeChat is an example of a non-Western digital media 
service that owes its success first to its platformization and then to the 
infrastructuralization of its platform model. Moreover, our findings showed that 
the infrastructuralization of the WeChat platform model in China is shaped by 
markedly techno-nationalist media regulations and an increasingly overt cyber-
sovereignty agenda. Drawing on the results of the analysis of technical 
documentation, business reports, as well as observations and interviews, we first 
present WeChat as both a platform and an infrastructure, and then we 
contextualize WeChat in the history of ICT infrastructure and the development of 
the internet in China. Finally, we analyze the specific role of the WeChat Pay 
service in establishing a new monetary transaction standard. We conclude by 
inquiring whether this emerging techno-nationalist model could be a plausible 
platform regulation in the future. 
 
Keywords: China, e-commerce, infrastructure, internet, platform, regulation, 
social media, techno-nationalism, Tencent, WeChat 
 
 
Introduction: One Billion Users 
In December 2016, Difan lost her smartphone: after walking away from the Shanghai Bund, the 
25-year old DJ realized the device was no longer in her coat pocket. Perhaps she had dropped it 
somewhere, perhaps it was pickpocketed while she was walking through the throngs of people 
shuffling around the waterfront. As she recounted a few days later, this experience made her 
suddenly realize how important the smartphone had become in her life. Specifically, the issue 
was that she had suddenly lost access to one app: WeChat. According to Difan, 
 
All of a sudden, I had no way of contacting my friends to tell them what happened. 
My parents freaked out because I was outside, and they couldn’t reach me by 
phone, and I was not replying to their messages on WeChat. I could only call 
them hours later when I managed to borrow a phone from a friend. And I didn’t 
have much cash with me because I usually pay stuff with WeChat Pay, so I 
couldn’t even buy something to eat, or get a cab…. [I]t’s crazy how much we rely 
on it. 
 
                                                          
*
Corresponding author. Email: j.plantin1@lse.ac.uk 
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By then, Difan had bought a new smartphone and recovered her number as well as the 
social media accounts connected to it, including WeChat. Although it was brief, the lack of 
access to a smartphone application left her with the clear awareness of how much social media 
platforms had become critical infrastructures of everyday life in China.
1
 
The existing research in communication studies has described how the properties of 
platforms reorganize business and sociability in various sectors (Gillespie, 2010; Helmond, 2015; 
Langlois & Elmer, 2013; van Dijck & Poell, 2013; van Dijck, Poell, & Waal, 2018). These 
authors extensively analyzed the current platformization (Helmond, 2015) of many aspects of 
society, whereby platforms restructure economic activity and sociability to the advantage and 
profit of the companies that own them. The present article contributes to this scholarship by 
showing that dominant internet companies base their power on more than the platform properties 
that these previous scholars have described, such as participation, modularity, and 
programmability. Increasingly, platforms include properties that are typically associated with 
infrastructure, such as scale, ubiquity, and criticality of use. Resulting from such encounters are 
hybrid entities that rely on the properties of both configurations to maintain and extend their 
social and market power. 
 The infrastructuralization of digital platforms (Plantin, Lagoze, Edwards, & Sandvig, 
2018) concerns several sectors that are familiar to Euro-American users, such as social media 
(Facebook and Google), transportation (Uber), mapping services (Google Maps), and even 
academic publications (e.g., Academia.edu). Moreover, it is usually discussed with reference to 
policy debates and regulatory frameworks in Europe or the US. In this article, we investigate the 
characteristics that this process assumes in non-Western, non-Anglocentric sociotechnical 
contexts. Focusing specifically on China, we ask the following questions: Are digital platforms 
undergoing similar infrastructuralization in the Chinese context? If so, what are the interactions 
between Chinese platforms and existing internet infrastructures? What is the role of the Chinese 
government in overseeing the emergence of digital platforms and regulating their infrastructural 
ambitions? 
We answer these questions by focusing on the Chinese social media application WeChat. 
Developed by Tencent Holdings, one of the largest Chinese internet conglomerates, WeChat has 
arguably become the most popular mobile application in China today. Outside China, WeChat is 
often depicted in business reports and technology journalism as a paradigmatic Chinese digital 
platform that is poised to replace Facebook or Google as the leading model of innovative 
products (Chan, 2015; Horwitz, 2014). Moving beyond these simplistic accounts, our focus on 
this application responds to recent calls for attention to the regional nature of digital platforms 
(Steinberg & Li, 2017; Lamarre, 2017) and the general goal of internationalizing internet studies 
(Goggin & McLelland, 2009). Moreover, by showing that WeChat now combines the properties 
of both platforms and infrastructure (Plantin et al., 2018), we both challenge and contribute to the 
debates on the issues of platform expansion, regulation, and social consequences, which are 
current in the Euro-American public discourse.  
Our study relied on a mixed-methods approach that was centered on the analysis of 
primary and secondary Chinese sources: First, we examined documents published by Tencent, 
such as technical documentation regarding the WeChat Application Programming Interface, or 
API (especially its WeChat Pay integration) and official WeChat blog posts detailing the features 
of Official Accounts and Mini Programs. Second, we searched industry reports, technology press 
reports, discussions on developer forums, and sources that highlighted how specific publics 
engage with WeChat’s features (e.g., how developers work with WeChat’s APIs). Third, our 
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study was based on vignettes extracted from observations and interviews conducted among 
Chinese social media users between 2015 and 2017 in Shanghai, which offered a lively account 
of WeChat usage in China. Our mixed-methods approach allowed us to study WeChat as both a 
technological and a discursive object, that is, a digital platform that is both used and discussed 
pervasively by different publics and actors. This approach helped us to determine the 
infrastructural features emerging from its integration in the everyday lives of its users. 
 In this article, we present two key arguments: First, WeChat is a paradigmatic example of 
a digital media service that owes its success first to its platformization and then to the 
infrastructuralization of its platform model. Second, the development of WeChat, which is 
situated in the specific context of China’s ICT industry, reveals how the platform model 
functions as a meeting ground for both the business ambitions of internet companies and the 
infrastructural ambitions of the Chinese authorities. In combination, these two arguments show 
that on one hand, the platform model that is currently embraced by internet companies 
worldwide has been successful in China because of its features, such as programmability, 
adaptability, and modularity. On the other hand, because this model has been shaped in China by 
markedly techno-nationalist media regulations (Qiu, 2010) and an increasingly overt cyber-
sovereignty agenda (Hao, 2017). It not only serves business purposes but also functions as a new 
model of infrastructure building. In China’s techno-nationalist context, where technological 
development is mobilized to secure national interests and advantages (Suttmeier & Yao, 2004, p. 
3), entities such as WeChat achieve infrastructural scale and criticality through well-documented 
platform dynamics. Simultaneously, these platform companies are allowed (and at times even 
encouraged) by government authorities to achieve their infrastructural ambitions as long as they 
are aligned with economic development and security interests. 
We first describe the dual nature of WeChat. Although it relies on characteristics typical 
of platforms, such as user participation and third-party development, the application increasingly 
has adopted the infrastructural properties of scale and criticality. Then we contextualize the 
infrastructuralization of WeChat in relation to the development of the internet in China, focusing 
on its regulatory context. Lastly, we connect WeChat’s platform properties to its increasingly 
infrastructural nature through an analysis of the success of the WeChat Pay system. We conclude 
by positing that the Chinese case serves as a relevant counterpoint to current debates in the US 
and Europe regarding the role of platforms in society and the regulation of their infrastructural 
ambitions. 
 
1. WeChat: From Platform to Infrastructure  
Scholars have recently begun to chart the social implications of WeChat’s configuration as a 
platform by approaching this mobile application through the socio-cultural analysis of 
communication patterns and practices. This body of work has examined specific aspects of 
WeChat, such as the aesthetics of selfies and other genres of vernacular photography (de Seta & 
Proksell, 2015), the circulation of user-generated content (de Seta, 2016), the use of stickers and 
other visual resources in everyday communication (Zhou, Hentschel, & Kumar, 2017), the 
identity construction of ethnic minorities (Grant, 2017), and the affect-centric design logics 
through which Tencent captures the attention of its young users (Peng, 2017). Although the 
existing research on WeChat offers a dazzling picture of its variety of uses, functions, and social 
roles, in this section, we show how WeChat’s platform features have coalesced to form an entity 
that has now acquired an infrastructural scale.  
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The platform logic of WeChat 
In 2011, Tencent released the mobile-oriented messaging application Weixin (“micro-message”), 
which is known in English as WeChat. Tencent applied its experience in messaging applications 
and content provision (especially its messaging service QQ), and rapidly augmented WeChat 
with social networking functions, such as the pengyouquan (“friend circle”) content feed, and the 
possibility of following the gongzhong pingtai (“public platform”) official accounts run by 
brands, organizations, and news outlets. Other functions that were added to the platform over the 
years included WeChat Pay, which is a digital wallet enabling users to perform mobile payments 
and send money to each other, City Services, which is a booking system for different kinds of 
public and private services in urban areas, and WeChat Search, which is a proprietary in-app 
search engine.  
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
The features that Tencent has added to WeChat during its development follow a platform 
logic the characteristics of which have already been extensively described for Western platforms 
(Helmond, 2015; van Dijck & Poell, 2013; van Dijck et al., 2018). They evidence Tencent’s 
“platform bundling” expansion strategy (Staykova & Damsgaard, 2016). The WeChat ecosystem 
relies on the active or passive participation of its users (Langlois; & Elmer, 2013). It is 
generative (Zittrain, 2008) and even performative (van Dijck, 2013), as the outcome of the 
interaction on the platform—while framed by controlled settings—is not necessarily known in 
advance.  
WeChat maintains APIs and allows developers to create applications. The Official 
Accounts (gongzhong pingtai, “public platform”) and the Mini Programs (Weixin Xiaochengxu, 
“WeChat small program”) are both typical examples of platform programmability (McKelvey, 
2011). Official Accounts are public profile pages capable of hosting simple scripted interactions 
and functionalities developed by third parties that are run by the WeChat software. These “in-app 
channels” can be followed by regular users, allowing content dissemination, audience 
management, and other functions, such as online news syndication and online commerce. Mini 
Programs are applets that run inside WeChat without the need to be downloaded on a phone. 
Discovered through a dedicated internal search engine, when “installed,” the Mini Programs 
appear as icons in a scrollable dock at the top of the WeChat conversations window, and they can 
be launched by a single tap inside the WeChat interface.  
In both Official Accounts and Mini Programs, the decentralization of software 
architecture combined with the re-centralization of its data flows are necessary processes in the 
platformization of social media (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; Helmond, 2015). WeChat allows 
access to its APIs to foster third-party development while maintaining control over the data that 
are accessed and the applications that are created. However, WeChat’s programmability is 
differentiated by a particularly closed environment. Official Accounts are “nested apps” rather 
than standalone applications (Tiwana, 2014), which exist only within WeChat’s application 
environment. Similarly, Mini Programs are applets that are positioned between WeChat’s 
Official Accounts and fully-fledged mobile applications (e.g., those available for downloading in 
the Apple and Android stores). Additionally, Mini Programs, although based on JavaScript, are 
written in Tencent proprietary coding languages derived from CSS and XML, which do not 
allow direct outlinking to web content. They rely on WeChat’s APIs, which restrict them to the 
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platform’s ecosystem. In addition to the learning curve that this proprietary language imposes on 
developers, the code of Mini Programs cannot be used outside WeChat. 
The features of Official Accounts and Mini Programs foreground WeChat’s platform 
logic in a way that is more immediate and striking than its original messaging functions were. 
Both Official Accounts and Mini Programs allow third-party developers to create applications 
while confining them to the WeChat environment. This restriction is evidence of a centralizing 
process that encloses growing amounts of information and interactions inside the platform, 
which then begins to exhibit properties that are usually associated with information infrastructure. 
 
The infrastructuralization of WeChat  
In recent years, many key internet companies, such as Google or Facebook, have moved one step 
beyond the platform model described above to attain levels of use, scale, and critical role in 
social life that characterize infrastructure (Plantin et al., 2018). Hybrid entities result from this 
combination. On one hand, the major internet companies still rely on the properties of platforms 
(as described above) to achieve network effects and to gain market power. On the other hand, 
they constitute large-scale sociotechnical projects that are aimed at the ubiquitous and reliable 
provision of a service, thus becoming similar to the traditional mandate of infrastructure 
(Edwards, 2003; Parks & Starosielski, 2015). This phenomenon can be observed not only in 
Silicon Valley companies but also in Chinese companies, such as Tencent.  
If WeChat is understood not as a platform but as an infrastructure, its large scale 
immediately becomes a defining property that is unequivocally mapped onto its massive user 
base. The increasing numbers regularly boasted by Tencent and echoed by business reports, such 
as one billion users after the 2018 Spring Festival (Weixin Pai, 2018), also evidence a smaller 
but noticeable presence in other national contexts. Similarly, WeChat has scaled up through the 
increasing number of services bundled in the application (Table 1), which compete with (and 
sometimes successfully replace) several services, such as monetary transactions, and 
administrative tools as well as cultural and social features. This proliferation of functions has led 
analysts to describe WeChat as “a portal, a platform, and even a mobile operating system” (Chan, 
2016).  
Both the massive usage scale and the plethora of services translate into a phenomenon 
that is impossible to miss for anyone who has been in China during the past five years. In a 
classic example of network effects, most of the authors’ contacts in China have moved their 
online presence from services like QQ and Sina Weibo to WeChat by asking to be added by 
phone number or quick response (QR) code, setting up chat groups, and starting to post regular 
updates on its Moments function. 
A third feature of infrastructure is that it becomes indispensable in social life (Edwards, 
2003, p. 187). Because of the ever-increasing number of WeChat’s functions, it has become 
increasingly hard to live in China without a WeChat account. Zhao Bo is a 35-year old Beijing 
resident related to one of the authors who boldly and brilliantly illustrates this phenomenon: 
  
I am the only Chinese person living in China that I know of who doesn’t use 
WeChat; I always wanted to find who else there is, but I can't find them. [...] For a 
Chinese living in China, the hardest part of resisting WeChat is dealing with the 
fact that almost all organizations (school classes, enterprises, danwei [units], 
shequ [local communities], social groups) use WeChat to manage their members. 
I just saw a leaflet posted by a local village government offering free access to 
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tourist resorts to disabled people, requiring a WeChat account and a smartphone 
to process. This proves how social organizations at the local community level 
have already become symbiotic with WeChat – one is forced to use WeChat in 
order to get the welfare provided by the local government. (Interview with one of 
the authors in February 2018) 
  
WeChat is an exemplary case of the infrastructural evolution of platforms that have 
succeeded commercially because of their properties, such as participation and programmability. 
They have become hybrid entities by rapidly achieving the scale and criticality of infrastructure. 
In the following section, we connect this process to China’s condensed history of infrastructure 
projects and ICT development. 
 
2. Building ICT Infrastructures in China 
The development of an infrastructure is never a standalone project. It depends on networks that 
build on and grow in relation to the existing infrastructure (Bowker & Star, 1999; Edwards, 
2010). Similarly, different political and regulatory contexts result in different patterns of system 
building (Hughes, 1983). In applying these two insights to the study of WeChat, we suggest that 
the infrastructural expansion of this platform needs to be understood in relation to the broad 
context of ICT development in China. In addition to countless similar applications and services, 
WeChat benefits from three decades of large-scale infrastructure projects that have been pushed 
by multiple Chinese leaders whose overall success relies on techno-nationalist policies and 
substantial investments.  
 
The rise of the Chinese Internet 
The internet arrived in China in 1987 through a precarious university connection between 
Beijing and Karlsruhe, yet stable internet access was not available until a decade later and to 
only a limited number of urban users (Zheng, 1994). The year 2000 was a significant turning 
point for China’s internet development, as the growing enthusiasm of the Chinese leadership for 
the concept of the “information superhighway” resulted in a national informatization strategy 
that was articulated through quinquennial plans to pour massive investments into the 
telecommunications infrastructure (Hong, 2015). In addition, because of the growing popularity 
and affordability of commercial and private internet access, the early 2000s saw the birth of 
many of the largest players in today’s digital industries, most of which started as online portals 
(e.g., Alibaba, NetEase, Sina, Tencent, etc.) and subsequently developed specialized domains 
including instant messaging, blogging, video streaming, video-gaming, e-commerce, and so on. 
Many of these companies, which were founded by pioneering entrepreneurs inspired by the 
Silicon Valley spirit (Tse, 2015), owed their early successes to their efforts to offer content and 
services that were tailored to the local needs of Chinese internet users. They offered Chinese-
language interfaces, provided efficient input methods for Chinese characters, and catered to 
locally relevant news and entertainment (Austin, 2014). 
 However, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a shift began to occur. On one 
hand, government authorities required increasingly restrictive registration licenses to operate 
websites hosted inside China, and they continued to refine the “Great Firewall” of surveillance 
systems and control apparatuses that were established in the preceding decade (Barme & Sang, 
1997). On the other hand, regional unrest and geopolitical turmoil (including heightened tensions 
in Xinjiang and threatening reverberations of the Arab Spring) prompted the Chinese 
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government impose several blockages on foreign (primarily American) internet companies. 
Consequently, massive social networking services, search engines, and content platforms, such 
as Facebook, Twitter, Google, and YouTube, joined the growing list of internet resources that 
were inaccessible by internet users in China.  
Conveniently, because the major players of the global platform economy (Srnicek, 2017) 
were unable to access the growing population of hundreds of millions of Chinese internet users, 
local internet companies and content providers had free rein to experiment and develop a 
national market as well as compete for audience niches and media formats. Combined with the 
massive uptake in mobile connectivity that the country was experiencing, microblogging services, 
such as Sina Weibo, and video-streaming platforms, such as Youku and Tudou, became 
increasingly popular (Voci, 2014; Wallis, 2011). Finally, the conjunction of pervasive 
smartphone ownership and 4G mobile internet penetration across the country during the 2010s 
contributed to funneling Chinese internet users away from the web toward platform applications 
that operated over the tightly guarded national network infrastructure. 
 These parameters resulted in the “Chinese internet” that we know today, which is 
dominated by the Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent trio (BAT), an acronym that echoes the GAFA 
“stacks” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) that are often discussed as the leaders of the global 
platform economy (Bratton, 2015; Galloway, 2017; Srnicek, 2017). Beginning as a search engine 
(Baidu), an e-commerce website (Alibaba), and a messaging software (Tencent), these three 
internet companies have expanded to massive conglomerates that operate across multiple 
domains (e.g., artificial intelligence, cloud computing, financial services, mobile payments, 
video-on-demand services, video-gaming, etc.) similar to the ways in which companies, such as 
Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook, operate in other regions. Tencent’s WeChat platform was 
developed and fostered in this context. 
 
Golden projects and infrastructure building 
The rise of large Chinese platforms followed two decades of the development of the Chinese 
internet. The history of the ICT infrastructure in China and its role in sustaining the Chinese 
techno-nationalist project (Qiu, 2010) are equally key in understanding the scale and power of 
digital platforms. Among all the large-scale infrastructure projects that emerged in China in the 
mid-1990s, the so-called “Great Firewall,” which is an ensemble of social media regulations, IP 
blacklists, keyword filters, data gateways, and human censors, is regularly invoked to explain 
online surveillance and internet censorship in China (Tsui, 2007). The Great Firewall is perhaps 
the most well-known example of Chinese ICT infrastructure. However, it is less known that the 
technologies that coalesced to form the Great Firewall originated in the “Golden Shield” project, 
an initiative launched by the Chinese government in the mid-1990s. Twelve other “Golden 
Projects” were supposed to increase the accountability of administrative departments and 
governmental agencies through the use of electronic technology (Hachigian, 2001, p. 127). In 
addition to the Golden Shield, these Golden Projects included the “Golden Bridge” (which was 
dedicated to providing central and local governments with updated economic data), the “Golden 
Sea” (which was aimed to exchange information among government leaders), the “Golden 
Customs” (which was designed to improve the operations of customs taxation) and the “Golden 
Card” (which was tasked with issuing credit cards, establishing a unified payment clearance 
system, and paving the way for e-commerce), among several others.  
The Golden Projects were implemented in the wake of the establishment in 1993 of the 
Joint Committee of National Economic Informatization. Their implementation was outlined in 
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the Ninth Five-Year Plan for Economic Development. Their purpose was declared to substantiate 
economic planning, streamline central decision making, and build an infrastructural backbone for 
the future “information superhighway.” At that time, the leadership was not interested in global 
connectivity (Kluver, 2005, p. 26). These infrastructural endeavors were touted as important 
components in establishing a functioning e-government framework that privileged the 
stabilization of the Chinese Communist Party and state authorities over citizen empowerment 
(Kluver, 2005, p. 76). With their emphasis on informatization and networked data-driven 
decision making, the Golden Projects were infrastructural efforts that were intricately interwoven 
with techno-nationalist rhetoric and the government’s will to establish China as a modern and 
developed state (p. 82).  
Even though the Golden Projects collapsed because of fragmented allegiances, patronage 
(Zhang, 2002), and ineffective technological solutionism (Kluver, 2005, p. 92), their history 
informs the rise of large-scale digital platforms, such as WeChat. The examples of mobile 
payment and WeChat Pay, which are analyzed in the following section, show that WeChat relies 
on platform properties to position itself as a de facto infrastructural standard. Indeed, their 
infrastructuralization might prove to be an infrastructure-building model that is more efficient 
than previous state-supported efforts were. 
 
3. WeChat Pay as Transaction Standard 
WeChat’s Pay digital wallet service was introduced in 2013. By 2015, it had swept across China. 
WeChat Pay has the social, temporal, and spatial features of a standard because of its capacity to 
occupy vacant social niches and to compete against the limitations of the Chinese banking 
infrastructure. By inserting itself in social practices and the Chinese banking infrastructure, the 
WeChat Pay feature has become a de facto payment standard in China, that is, a “set of agreed-
upon rules” that links multiple communities of practice across space and time into a coherent 
action (Bowker & Star, 1999, pp. 13–14). WeChat Pay’s QR codes provide strategic gateways 
for this payment standard adoption, effectively positioning WeChat Payment as an intermediary 
for the multiple parties of a commercial transaction. 
 
An infrastructure for the digital economy  
When Tencent introduced mobile payment as a WeChat feature in 2013, it faced the dual 
challenge common to all platforms: the ability to convince not only users to record their financial 
credentials on the app but also third-party merchants to set up online stores and payment 
accounts. WeChat solved this problem with its existing social features. During the Chinese New 
Year holiday in 2014, a new function called “Lucky Money” was introduced in the app, through 
which users could exchange digital hongbao (“red envelopes”) as chat attachments. Available in 
both one-to-one and randomly split group versions, these red envelopes were monetary 
transactions that familiarized users with their WeChat Pay wallets (Chan, 2016). One year later 
in 2015, during the Chinese New Year holiday, WeChat was partnered with the CCTV Spring 
Festival gala to distribute money offered by sponsors among lucky users who were quick enough 
to shake their phones when prompted by on-screen notifications on their TVs. Again, the clever 
combination of holiday customs and trans-media promotion bootstrapped the active use of 
WeChat Pay by pouring sponsored money into users’ wallets, thus dramatically increasing the 
user base for this service.  
 To understand the success of WeChat Pay and its rise as an infrastructural standard, such 
payment features must be framed beyond the well-documented interplay between private 
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companies and the state. They must be considered in the broad context of the rapidly growing 
Chinese digital economy, particularly the role of finance capital (Jia & Winseck, 2018). This 
context includes the entrepreneurial drive of individual users engaging in e-commerce, service 
provision, and innovation (Yu, 2017). In this context, the success of WeChat Pay (as well as 
other online payment services, such as Alipay, which is now operated by the Alibaba affiliate 
Ant Financial) has resulted to large extent from its capacity to compensate the limitations of the 
existing Chinese banking infrastructure. State-owned financial institutions traditionally offer 
extremely low interest rates. Historically, they have provided loans mainly to large enterprises 
and local governments, whereas households and small companies have had difficulty in 
accessing credit (Ong, 2012). In contrast to this model, the internet finance industry uses the 
platform’s logic by positioning itself between the actors engaged in a transaction (e.g., a buyer 
and a seller or a friend transferring money to another friend). In 2017, this successful model was 
used to process 60% of all online payments in China (Loubere, 2017, p. 14). 
 
QR code as gateway 
Gateways are a sociotechnical component of strategic importance in the growth of infrastructure, 
as they provide the “plugs and sockets that allow new systems to be joined to an existing 
framework easily and with minimal constraint” (Edwards et al., 2007, p. 16). In WeChat Pay, a 
key gateway relies on the combination of two technologies: the QR code and the smartphone 
camera. Tencent did not invent this two-dimensional barcode (which originated in the Japanese 
automotive industry). However, its integration into WeChat Pay has been a main factor in 
driving the popularity of machine-readable encoding in everyday Chinese life. When it is 
scanned by the camera in a mobile device that is connected to the internet, the QR code transmits 
application metadata, a URL, or information about a monetary transaction, thus seamlessly 
bridging physical surfaces (i.e., a restaurant counter), computational devices (i.e., a customer’s 
smartphone) and user data (i.e., WeChat wallet credit). WeChat has recently launched an entirely 
proprietary version of this encoding format, which is recognizable by its rounded, colorful, and 
image-rich design. At present, it is used only as a quick way of linking to Mini Programs, 
effectively reinforcing the lock-in of user activity inside the WeChat ecosystem, which is 
described in section one. 
  
***Figure 1 about here*** 
 
Because of their social implications, standards are subject to oversight by legal bodies. Such 
oversight currently applies to WeChat Pay in the form of a post hoc regulation drafted by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which is the central Chinese bank. In 2017, the bank 
announced that it aimed to reassert its control over transactions made by third parties (Hersey, 
2017). Since June 2018, the PBOC has obliged WeChat Pay and 44 other financial firms to 
transfer all their transaction data to a nationwide “clearing house.” This measure is aimed to 
compensate the current incapacity of the PBOC to track and monitor the flow of capital 
exchanged between third parties, which allegedly facilitates money laundering and other 
irregularities. By setting up this clearing house as a platform between the two parties engaged in 
a financial transaction (Zhang, 2017), this measure illustrates that the PBOC has adapted to the 
platform logic of online banking to carry out its mission of financial oversight. 
 
4. Shaping Digital Platforms into National Infrastructures in China 
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If the analysis stopped at this point, we could provide a straightforward description of WeChat 
through existing theories of platform capitalism and the political economy of platforms. 
However, the Chinese case presents normative differences from the Euro-American context. 
American digital platforms, such as Facebook and Google, have global ambitions and seek to 
bypass national governments (which leads to socio-economic controversies and regulatory 
pushbacks), whereas Chinese internet companies that own the country’s largest digital platforms 
have tight (albeit sometimes conflictual) relationships with national policy-making and 
regulatory authorities. These relationships are intimately linked to the broad history of internet 
development and ICT infrastructure building described in section two, and they result in a 
platform model that is simultaneously shaped by the characteristics of Chinese national media 
regulations and allowed to flourish as a vector of infrastructure building. In this concluding 
section, we connect the example of WeChat to the broad context of what we identify as a 
“Chinese model” of platform infrastructuralization, and we hint at its usefulness in the current 
debate about platform regulation. 
 
The techno-nationalist shaping of digital platforms 
In China, the authorities have strived to maintain control of digital communication technologies 
since the first internet providers were established in the country. The emergence of digital 
platforms has also been met by regulation and oversight. A speech by Chinese President Xi 
Jinping in 2017 during a seminar on cyber-security indicated recognition of the centrality of 
platforms on the current internet and the importance of their regulation: 
  
As a broad social platform through which millions upon millions of users obtain 
and exchange information, the internet has a profound influence on the way 
people acquire knowledge on the way they think, and also on their values and 
views [...]. A sound atmosphere for the expression of opinion online [...] means 
that people are not permitted to conflate right and wrong, circulate rumors, cause 
trouble, violate the law, or commit crime [...]. An important means of doing this 
will be to exert the role of public scrutiny, including scrutiny on the Internet 
[emphasis added]. (Xi, 2017, pp. 363–365) 
 
In addition to the “Great Firewall” described in section two, the “scrutiny” of the internet 
has taken multiple and widely discussed forms during the past two decades, such as real-name 
registration requirements (Wang, 2010), specialized “Internet Police” units for surveillance and 
cybercrime (Austin, 2014, p. 65), and content guidelines for delegating censorship to online 
platforms (Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith, 2012). While a tight techno-nationalist grip on the 
internet expectedly leads to a conflictual compliance of digital platforms with regulations and 
directives, when it comes to infrastructural ambitions, local internet companies and Chinese 
authorities see more eye-to-eye. The protectionist environment resulting from the demanding 
regulatory conditions to operate in the Chinese market and the outright bans of foreign 
companies still allows Chinese platforms to easily reach the criticality and scale (at least on a 
national base) required to nullify competition by the few foreign companies still allowed to 
operate inside China. 
The “Chinese model” of platform infrastructuralization therefore comprises two facets: 
On one hand, the once-massive “national champions” of the internet industry, such as Tencent, 
have achieved a solid grasp on certain infrastructural properties through platforms such as 
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WeChat. They can easily pursue infrastructural ambitions by modulating the programmability of 
their platforms and by using them as a means of establishing infrastructural standards. On the 
other hand, when they are confronted with this emerging process, Chinese authorities allow these 
ambitious companies to disrupt inefficient public sectors, as long as they do not compromise 
sociopolitical stability and remain aligned with the techno-nationalist pursuit of cyber-
sovereignty. Based on the description of WeChat Pay as a highly successful example of the 
infrastructuralization of a platform feature shaped by techno-nationalist policy (section three), it 
could be provocatively argued that WeChat Pay and similar services by other technology 
companies have managed to succeed in building an infrastructure that the decade-long Golden 
Card project struggled to do, that is, create an integrated nationwide payment system that 
supported the growth of e-commerce and online financial services. 
 
The “Chinese Model” as the future of platform regulation 
Infrastructuralized platforms have a global reach. The question of how these platforms should be 
regulated is currently being asked in Euro-American contexts (Andrews, 2016; Helberger, 
Pierson, & Poell, 2017; Mansell, 2015). Calls for the nationalization of digital platforms, such as 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Uber, the dissolution of their expanding monopolies, and the 
enforcement of tax regulations are often framed as solutions for remediating the social wrongs of 
platforms, such as data privacy, misinformation, unfair competition, and illegal labor practices. 
The case of WeChat and the broad regulatory context of the “Chinese model” of platform 
infrastructuralization offer some answers regarding specific aspects of the regulations in practice. 
The first answer is platform protectionism. As the growth of WeChat demonstrates, 
imposing commercial and security thresholds on platform companies that seek to expand their 
business internationally is likely to result in a national market where domestic platforms can 
thrive without having to compete with the networks of already established competitors, such as 
Facebook or the messaging application LINE. The second answer is governmental control. In a 
protectionist and tightly regulated environment, platforms are likely to make trade-offs with state 
authorities and enforce user surveillance guidelines in exchange for being allowed to continue to 
operate in the national market. The third answer is nationalization. Although WeChat increasing 
resembles a public utility, through its active collaboration with Chinese authorities in the 
development of public services (e.g., ID cards, city administration, etc.), it is not nationalized. 
Instead, Tencent chairman Ma Huateng serves as a deputy on the National People’s Congress, 
and his company hosts Communist Party committees in its offices, which ensure a smooth 
relationship with the government. The company also allows authorities to tap into its data 
collection capabilities and to curb its infrastructural ambitions from the inside (Heilmann, 2017). 
Based on these insights, we conclude that through infrastructuralization “with Chinese 
characteristics,” WeChat’s platform model is a vector for infrastructure-building endeavors that 
prove to be both more successful than their state-backed precedents, and more controllable than 
purely private entities. However, Chinese leaders and Chinese entrepreneurs have not resolved 
the thorny issues of regulating the platform economy or managing its infrastructural ambitions, 
which remain problematic, sometimes conflictual, and largely opaque because of high amount of 
behind-the-scenes dealing. Similar to the US context, platform companies shape policy through 
outreach, lobbying, and political participation (Kreiss & McGregor, 2018). However, in China, 
these practices are conducted through structures and strategies that suit the intricacies of the 
Chinese Communist Party governance. The “Chinese model” of platform infrastructuralization 
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therefore offers a thought-provoking alternative to the Silicon Valley model, which frames 
current regulatory discussions. 
 
Conclusion  
This article has provided a detailed analysis of specific features of the internet platform WeChat 
and its Official Account, Mini Programs, and WeChat Pay in the context of China’s ICT 
development. This focus was necessary to understand how the process of infrastructuralization is 
applied to digital platforms and how they are shaped by specific use cases and national policy 
decisions. By viewing Chinese digital platforms through an infrastructural lens, we hope to 
encourage the production of further nuanced comparative analyses of platforms in different 
regional, national, and local contexts. As indicated by the thoroughly infrastructural nature of the 
Great Firewall and by the techno-nationalist character of China’s digital media governance, 
which was briefly mentioned in our article, the “Chinese model” of infrastructure building we 
identify is highly idiosyncratic. Hence, it is not meant to be a ready-made model that should be 
applied to all platform regulations and policy dilemmas. After all, the success of WeChat and 
similar platforms is strongly correlated to the heavy-handed ban on foreign competitors and to 
Tencent’s compliance with government demands. Nevertheless, we argue that the “Chinese 
model” should not be reduced to platform capitalism “with Chinese characteristics” nor should it 
be dismissed as the outright authoritarian control of digital media. When it is framed by the 
context of the contemporary debate about the nationalization of digital platforms and the 
infrastructural ambitions of platform companies, this model could be a thought-provoking 
alternative that is not merely speculative but is currently being implemented in China, which has 
the world’s largest population of internet users. 
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Table 1. The Growth and Evolution of WeChat Evidencing the Scale of its Monthly Active Users 
(MAU) and Its Expanding Portfolio of Features 
Date Monthly 
active users 
Newly introduced features 
2011 50 million Messaging, photo-sharing and voice and video clip functions; 
locational user search 
2012 160 million Rebranded to WeChat for the international market; Moments and 
Official Accounts functions launched; QR codes; voice and video call 
function; WeChat Web interface 
2013 355 million Stickers and personalized emoticons; social games; group chats; 
WeChat wallet 
2014 500 million Partnership with taxi-hailing app Didi Dache; WeChat in-app stores; 
account-to-account money transfers 
2015 697 million City Services feature; virtual “Red Envelopes” introduced on Chinese 
New Year 
2016 889 million Service charge for transfers between WeChat wallet and debit cards for 
transactions over 1,000 RMB 
2017 963 million Mini-Program function, search function added to news feed 







Figure 1. A variety of QR codes and platform affiliations (Baidu Take-out, WeChat, Alipay, 
ianping, Meituan, E’leme) on stickers and plastic plaques displayed on the counter of a restaurant 
in Shanghai. Photo by the Gabriele de Seta, 2016. 
 
